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Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics
Kristie Miller†
Abstract
Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world: under what
conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through time; whether properties are univer-
sals or tropes. It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is
necessarily true. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently
emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate
between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars. This paper argues that we should be
contingentists about monism and pluralism, and it defends contingentism against some necessi-
tarian objections by offering an epistemology of contingent metaphysical claims.
1. Introduction
First-order metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our
world: under what conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through
time; whether properties are universals or tropes, and so on. It is widely held that
these kinds of first-order metaphysical truths are not just truths about our world,
but are truths about every world: they are metaphysically necessary. By metaphysi-
cal possibility I intend to include the least restrictive sphere of genuine possibili-
ties that does not include the merely epistemic possibilities. Thus although there
might be a difference between what is logically or conceptually necessary and
what is metaphysically necessary insofar as there is a difference in what grounds
those modal facts, the sphere of the metaphysically possible worlds is not a proper
sub-set of the sphere of logically or conceptually possible worlds.
These sorts of metaphysical claims routinely assumed to be necessary include
claims about the conditions of composition, the nature of persistence, the nature of
properties, the existence of abstract objects and the nature of the laws of nature
(although usually not the token laws). This paper looks at the debate between the
orthodox view, that such claims are necessary, and a recently emerging view that
they are contingent, by focusing on a metaphysical debate that has been receiving
increasing attention. This is the debate between monists and pluralists about
concrete particulars. The traditional view is pluralism, the claim that, very roughly,
there exist many concrete particulars. More recently, however, a small number of
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metaphysicians (most notably Horgan 2000 and Schaffer 2007) have argued for
monism, the view that, very roughly, there is only one concrete particular, or only
one fundamental concrete particular. Ultimately, the issue concerns how we should
understand the relationship between the world and what exists at the sub-regions
of that world.1 This paper defends the claim that we should be contingentists about
monism and pluralism.
Section 2 offers a systematic taxonomy of the various versions of monism and
pluralism, a taxonomy that allows us more clearly to see how to show that these
views are necessary or, alternatively, contingent. Section 3 builds on some recent
work by Gideon Rosen in trying to show that these claims are not necessary truths.
In Section 4 I consider the possibility that we should embrace necessitarianism
because of epistemological threats raised by contingentism. I try to show first, that
the necessitarian is epistemologically no better off than the contingentist, and
second, I try and offer a tentative way of making sense of how we could come to
know contingent metaphysical claims by appealing to a priori necessary condi-
tional claims. Section 5 builds on this idea by considering particular arguments
for monism, and showing not only that these arguments militate in favour of
contingentism, but further, that we can use them to show how a contingentist could
come to know metaphysical facts. Therefore, I conclude, we should embrace
contingentism.
2. Monism and pluralism
The special composition question, posed by van Inwagen (1990), asks under what
conditions some particulars compose a further particular. That question has been
answered in very different ways, ranging from compositional nihilism (the view
that there are no conditions under which composition occurs) at one end of the
spectrum, to unrestricted composition (the view that for any arbitrary particulars,
those particulars compose something) at the other.
Until recently, parties to this debate disagreed about under what conditions
some particulars compose a further particular, but they agreed on the form of the
question to be answered. They agreed, at a very general level, on a particular
methodology: a bottom-up methodology. This methodology seeks to answer the
question of which entities exist by asking under what conditions composition
occurs, where it is, often tacitly, assumed that non-fundamental compose entities
are ultimately composed of fundamental simple entities. Thus the methodology
1 I use the phrase ‘at which it exists’ and ‘exists at’ and their cognates as neutral between
a view according to which the world occupies a region of space-time, and a view according to
which it is identical to a region of space-time.
Kristie Miller2
© 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 Editorial Board of dialectica.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
22
33 4
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 3 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Thu Feb 12 16:44:34 2009 SUM: 684D3910
/v2503/blackwell/journals/dltc_v0_i0/dltc_1181
tends to presuppose that there is a particular direction of dependence2 between the
world and any particulars that wholly exist3 at the sub-regions of the world.
Consider what we might call the fundamentality question. This is the question
of whether the world is fundamental, and any particulars that exist at sub-regions
of the world as non-fundamental4 proper parts of the world, or whether the
particulars that exist at sub-regions of the world are fundamental, and anything
composed of those particulars as non-fundamental. The bottom-up methodology
does not entail, but fits very nicely with, a particular answer to the fundamentality
question, namely one that takes proper parts of the world to be fundamental, and
the world to be non-fundamental.5 We might think of this view of fundamentality
as also a bottom-up view according to which fundamentality relations hold from
the bottom up, and the bottom level of ontology is the most fundamental. The view
that most naturally follows from this view is that at bottom there are fundamental
building blocks – simples – from which everything else non-fundamental is com-
posed. Call this view pluralism.6
An alternative methodology, which has recently become popular, is top-down.
This methodology asks under what conditions the world decomposes into parts.
This methodology does not entail, but fits nicely with, a quite different answer to
the fundamentality question according to which fundamentality relations are top-
down. That is, the world is considered to be fundamental, and any of its parts
merely derivative. According to this view then, there exists a fundamental world,
and we ask under what conditions the world decomposes into non-fundamental
proper parts.7 This view is monism.8
2 I borrow the notion of dependence from Schaffer (unpublished, p. 6). For Schaffer,
dependence is a synchronic ordering relation – it is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive – that
entails that the dependent supervenes upon that upon which it depends. The direction of depen-
dence is determined by an asymmetry-maker, in this case the parthood related, which yields a
mereological hierarchy and hence a hierarchy of dependence.
3 Of course, the world exists at all of its sub-regions. The issue is which other particulars
exist; that is, for each sub-region of the world, is there some particular that exists at just that
sub-region. I will say that a particular P wholly exists at a region R iff for every sub-region R* of
R, P exists at R*, and there is no region R# that is discrete from R, such that P exists at R#.
4 Or derivative, to use Schaffer’s term (unpublished, p. 5).
5 Where fundamentality is understood in terms of dependence. The proper parts of the
world are fundamental and the world non-fundamental just in case the world depends on the
proper parts.
6 I borrow this terminology from Sider (2007) and Schaffer (2007).
7 It might be that this involves the general view that the part/whole relation is a
dependence relation in which the part is dependent on the whole. Or it might be that it involves
only the weaker claim that there is a dependence relation between the world and its parts, such
that the world is fundamental and the parts are non-fundamental. This latter would leave it open
that the direction of dependence between some of the proper parts of the world and their parts
might be the reverse: the parts of proper-parts of the world might be more fundamental than the
proper parts themselves.
8 I borrow this term from Schaffer (2007) and Sider (2007).
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Monists and pluralists answer the fundamentality question differently. The
former hold that the world is fundamental; the latter hold that some proper parts of
the world are fundamental. Now consider what we might call the ontological
question, the question of which non-fundamental concrete particulars exist. Plu-
ralists think that this question should be answered by appeal to the special com-
position question. Non-fundamental composite particulars exist just where some
plurality of simples meet the conditions under which composition occurs9 Monists
think that this question should be answered by appeal to the special decomposition
question (if you will), which asks under what conditions some whole – the world
– decomposes into particulars. Non-fundamental particulars exist just when the
conditions are met under which decomposition occurs.
There are three possible answers to the special composition question, and three
possible answers to the special decomposition question. These are the same three
answers: composition/decomposition occurs always, sometimes, or never. Call the
view that composition/decomposition never occurs nihilism.10 Call the view that
composition/decomposition occurs under only some circumstances restrictivism.11
And call the view that composition/decomposition occurs under all circumstances
universalism.12 Nihilism, restrictivism and universalism offer three different
answers to the ontological question. When we combine different answers to the
fundamentality question with different answers to the ontological question, we get
six distinct metaphysical views. Call each of these views a complete metaphysical
account, or CMA.13
Then, for any world w such that we can decompose w into multiple disjoint
regions each of which is occupied by some particular,14 nihilistic monism is true in
w just in case in w there exists just one fundamental simple particular, the world.
(Although the world is a simple, it can nevertheless be a structurally complex
spatio-temporally extended simple.)15 Universalist monism is true in w just in case
for any occupied sub-region in w there is some non-fundamental proper part of w
9 Henceforth when I talk of which particulars exist, I intend to refer only to concrete
particulars.
10 See for instance Unger (1979).
11 See for instance van Inwagen (1990); Merricks (2001); McCall (1994).
12 See for instance Lewis (1986, pp. 212-213); Sider (2001); Schaffer (unpublished);
Heller (1990).
13 I do not intend to suggest that these six CMAs are exhaustive. It could be that there
are no fundamentality relations at all, or at least that the world and the simples in it are equally
fundamental. But dividing the terrain in this way is helpful, and it is these six CMAs in which I
am interested.
14 Where disjoint regions R1 and R2 can each be occupied, without us presupposing that
there are two distinct particulars, one of which occupies R1 and the other R2: it could be that R1
and R2 are both occupied by the very same particular.
15 This is the view defended by Horgan and Potrcˇ (2000) and which they call blobjec-
tivism, and it is the view that Schaffer (2007) calls existence monism.
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that wholly exists16 at that region.17 Restrictivist monism is true in w just in case for
some and only some occupied sub-regions of w there are particulars that wholly
exist at those sub-regions and these particulars are non-fundamental proper parts
of w. Nihilistic pluralism is true in w just in case every occupied region in w can
be decomposed into a plurality of simple fundamental particulars, and those
simple particulars do not compose any composite objects.18 Universalist pluralism
is true in w just in case every occupied region in w can be decomposed into a
plurality of fundamental particulars, such that for any arbitrary set of those par-
ticulars there is a non-fundamental particular that those particulars compose.19
Finally, restrictivist pluralism is true in w just in case every occupied region in w
can be decomposed into a plurality of fundamental particulars, such that for some
and only some of those particulars there is a non-fundamental particular that those
particulars compose.20
The claim that the CMAs are modally necessary should then be interpreted as
the claim that, for every world in the set of worlds W such that we can decompose
each of the worlds in W into multiple disjoint regions each of which is occupied by
some particular, the very same CMA is true at each of those worlds.21 The idea is
that we are only interested in worlds in the W set because these are the only worlds
in which it makes sense to ask which CMA is true: worlds, for instance, in which
there is just a single point-sized object are ones in which the issue of composition
and fundamentality does not arise.
For the purposes of this paper I will largely set aside restrictivist monism and
restrictivist pluralism, since I think the strongest case for necessitarianism can be
made by considering universalist and nihilist versions of monism and pluralism.
I am doubtful that any account that restricts composition in a precise and non-
arbitrary manner can at the same time admit into our ontology largely the objects
restrictivists tend to want to admit, and less likely that this will be so in other
possible worlds. Anyway it is sufficient to vindicate contingentism to show that
universalist and nihilist versions of monism and pluralism are best thought of as
contingent, without considering any other CMAs.
16 Where a particular P wholly exists a sub-region R just in case none of P occupies any
region that is not a part of R and every part of R is occupied by P.
17 This is the view defended by Schaffer (2007 and unpublished), which he calls priority
monism.
18 This is the view sometimes known as nihilism, or compositional nihilism, and
defended by Unger (1979).
19 This is the view known as universalism, mereological universalism or unrestricted
composition and defended by, for instance, Sider (2001), Lewis (1986) and Quine (1963).
20 This is the view defended by, for instance, Merricks (2000) and van Inwagen (1990).
21 See Schaffer (unpublished); van Inwagen (1990); Sider (2001); Markosian (2007).
For a rare alternative view see Parsons (unpublished) and Cameron (forthcoming).
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Since each CMA is the conjunction of two claims, one regarding which
account of fundamentality is true – monism or pluralism – and the other regarding
which account of composition or decomposition is true – nihilism, restrictivism or
universalism – necessitarianism is the conjunction of two claims.
Claim 1: Either monism is necessarily true or pluralism is necessarily true.22
Claim 2: If monism is true, then the correct answer to the special decomposition
question is a necessary truth, and if pluralism is true, then the correct answer to the
special composition question is a necessary truth.23
If either Claim 1 or Claim 2 is false, then necessitarianism is false. This paper
seeks only to establish that there is good reason to suppose that at least one of
Claim 1 or Claim 2 is false, and hence good reason to embrace contingentism.
3. General arguments for contingentism
Gideon Rosen (2006) has argued compellingly that there is a large range of
metaphysical theses that make substantial ontological claims about our and other
worlds that are plausibly neither conceptual nor logical truths, nor a posteriori
Kripkean necessities. For instance, although certain axioms of mereology might be
conceptual truths that tell us what it is to be a part, or to be a whole composed of
parts, the axioms that tell us which mereological composites exist are not concep-
tual claims of this kind. One could perfectly well understand the parthood relation
without endorsing unrestricted mereological composition. Rosen suggests that
these latter sorts of axioms should be thought of as conditionals such as: given
that there are mereological aggregates, then for any xs, those xs compose a y. But
that conditional does not guarantee that every world is one in which there are
mereological aggregates. The strategy is not unfamiliar. Hartry Field agrees with
Hale and Wright that if there are numbers, then Hume’s Principle (the number of
Fs equals the number of Gs just in case there the Fs and the Gs are equinumerous)
is true. He merely disagrees with Hale and Wright that as stated Hume’s principle
is a conceptual truth that guarantees the existence of necessarily existing math-
ematical objects (see Field 1993; Hale and Wright 1992).
The claims made by monists and pluralists are clearly of the sort that Rosen has
in mind. Indeed, one of the claims that make up each of the CMAs is a claim about
composition that precisely involves whether or not unrestricted mereological com-
position is a necessary truth or not. Rosen’s suggestion that these axioms only
22 This presupposes the monism and pluralism are exhaustive. I think that is a plausible
assumption. More importantly, dialectically the assumption aids the necessitarian, since it means
that showing that one of these views is necessarily false entails that the other view is necessarily
true, and hence is sufficient to show that necessitarianism is true.
23 Or more simply, Claim 2: The correct answer to the special composition/
decomposition question is a necessary truth.
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express conceptual truths when interpreted as conditionals seems right. The appro-
priate conditional is not, I think, the one that Rosen suggests since that would rule
out restricted composition as a mereological claim. Rather, given that there are,
unrestrictedly, mereological aggregates, then for any xs, those xs compose a y.
Given that there are some mereological aggregates, then for some xs, those xs
compose a y. Given that there are no composites, for any xs, those xs do not
compose a y. Everyone can agree that these conditionals are conceptual truths.
Since it does not seem to be a conceptual truth that the antecedents hold in every
world, we have reason to suppose that none of the compositional claims of monism
and pluralism is a conceptual truth.
Such metaphysical claims also seem to be poor candidates to be Kripkean a
posteriori necessities. A posteriori necessities frequently occur when a term func-
tions as a rigid designator. Some metaphysical claims of the kind Rosen has in
mind might turn out to be a posteriori necessities. It is at least not obviously crazy
for Armstrong and Heathcote (1991) to assert that it is an a posteriori necessity
that causation involves a relation of nomic necessitation between the properties
that are the causal relata. Similarly, one can imagine a range of metaphysical
claims about the nature of space-time that might be a posteriori necessities.
Perhaps if actually space-time is substantival, then relationist worlds are worlds
that, as a matter of a posteriori necessity, lack space-time. Perhaps if our world is
one in which there are relations of nomic necessitation, then worlds without such
relations are worlds without laws of nature as a matter of a posteriori necessity.
But none of the CMAs look like they will be a posteriori necessary. It is
certainly counterintuitive that any of the relevant terms have a descriptive content
that includes a rigid component,24 or that the extensions of these terms are prop-
erties, relations, or mass nouns with which we are causally connected in the way
that the direct reference theorist thinks that we are, say, causally connected to
water samples.25 It is hard to imagine, for instance, that if we discovered that in our
world unrestricted mereological composition holds, that we would conclude that
composition is whatever composition relation obtains actually, where the actual
relation is defined in terms of the relevant set of mereological axioms. That would
be the discovery that it is a posteriori necessary that unrestricted composition
holds.Yet it seems implausible that in a counterfactual world w in which there exist
simples but only some mereological ‘composites’ that we should conclude not that
w is a world with restricted composition, but rather a world with schmoposition,
24 As would be the case on a largely descriptivist account of rigid designation. In that
case we hold that part of the descriptive content – the part to which we have access a priori – is
that the term refers, in all worlds, to whatever it refers to actually. See Chalmers (2004) and
Jackson (1998, 2004).
25 See for instance Block and Stalnaker (1999).
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since composition rigidly picks out the relation defined to include the axiom: for
any xs, those xs compose a y. Composition just does not seem to be that kind of
relation.26
As Rosen would put it, we should think that a proposition P is possible just in
case P is correctly conceivable, where P is correctly conceivable just in case P does
not entail a logical inconsistency when combined with a full specification of the
natures of the kinds it concerns. Thus in the case of obvious conceptual truths, it
is not possible to correctly conceive that those truths are not true. But correct
conceivability is supposed to guarantee that, given that we specify all the relevant
natures of the things involved, we cannot correctly conceive as being false what is
a posteriori necessary. Thus the idea is that we cannot correctly conceive of
water’s being other than H2O given that it is H2O, because this is not logically
consistent with its being the essential nature of water to be whatever it is actually.
Whenever we are considering claims about water, a full specification of the
relevant intrinsic properties will include a specification that actually water is H2O,
and will tell us what the chemical composition is of any watery substances we are
considering counterfactually.
The idea is that this procedure avoids modal error. Prima facie, though, it is not
clear that it avoids modal error altogether. Notoriously, there are those who claim
that we can correctly conceive of zombie worlds, worlds that are minimal physical
duplicates of the actual world, but which lack phenomenal character (Chalmers
1996). Since physicalism just is the claim that necessarily, any minimal physical
duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter, such correct conceiving would
entail the truth of dualism. The problem is that even avowed physicalists often find
themselves able to conceive of the zombie world, while being convinced that
physicalism is true. They, then, must contend that correct conceiving has led them
astray: such a world is not possible.
The most plausible hypothesis advanced by physicalists to explain their
apparently being able to conceive of the zombie world is that there is something
pertinent that we do not know: either we do not know some facts about the
entailment of the phenomenal from the physical, or we do not know some physical
facts. We are required to correctly conceive of the entire physical nature of a world
being reproduced sans phenomenal character. But there is much about the nature
of that world that we do not know, so it is not surprising that we think we can
conceive of the physical facts without the phenomenal facts. Whether this is a
compelling response, given that the physicalist cannot tell us what sorts of facts are
the ones that we do not know, is debatable and not of concern here. The point is
just that the response is entirely consistent with the methodology of correct
26 Although see Williams (2006) for an alternative view.
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conceivability since they appeal to the existence of facts – internal natures or
relevant facts – which if we knew them, would render the zombie world not
correctly conceivable.
Moreover, although many physicalists think that the phenomenal facts are
entailed by the physical facts in our world, they allow that there could be non-
physical worlds. Necessitarians, however, think that metaphysical claims hold in
every world, and so in some good sense they do not think that the distribution of
matters of fact substantively entails the metaphysical truths (although it does so
trivially). Given this, we might think that the methodology is on even firmer
footing with respect to metaphysical claims, since, unlike in the case of the zombie
world, it is unclear what sort of non-metaphysical matters of fact we could be
ignorant of that would lead us to think that a particular metaphysical thesis is
correctly conceivable when in fact it is not.
4. Necessitarians fight back
The quick route to contingentism about the CMAs, then, is to note that each seems
to be correctly conceivable, and leave it at that. Since it is standard to presuppose
that these views are necessary truths, however, it is worth considering on what
grounds necessitarians might reject contingentism.
4.1. Metaphysical claims as conceptual truths
One suggestion is that we have dismissed too soon the notion that the metaphysical
claims in question are conceptual truths. One strategy is to show that they are; the
other is to show that we have no good reason to think that they are not. Consider
the second of these strategies first. One might accept that correct conceivability is
a guide to possibility, but be sceptical of our ability to correctly conceive. Perhaps
we lack a sufficiently good grasp of our own concepts to know if we are correctly
conceiving some proposition obtaining at a world. We can imagine a case in which,
even if we know all of the relevant facts about the essences of the entities involved,
we might still think that we can correctly conceive of water as being other than
H2O. Some of these cases are explained by our having failed to interrogate our
concept sufficiently rigorously. So, for instance, although we know all the relevant
facts about actual and counterfactual worlds, what we don’t yet know is that our
concept of water is rigid; we might mistakenly think it is merely functional. This
is not very worrying. But there is a further worry in the background, which is that
one might think that the true concept being deployed is the one that would in fact
guide what we say given various discoveries about the actual nature of water and
the intrinsic properties of other counterfactual watery substances. But we might be
wrong about that even after a great deal of interrogation of our concept. For what
we think we would do, what we think our dispositions will be, might turn out to be
Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics 9
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different from what they in fact will be. I think that there is a genuine danger that
sometimes we might be wrong about our concepts. I am not at all sure that if we
discovered that a large percentage of the Pacific Ocean was actually not H2O but
some entirely different molecule that reacts like water in almost all situations, that
we wouldn’t say that water is a disjunction of those two substances, or that it picks
out any property that plays the water role and nothing that does not, whether that
stuff is H2O or not. But I would be very surprised if these kinds of mistakes were
occurring in metaphysical debates like that between the monist and the pluralist. It
is hard to see what I could discover about my concept of composition, or funda-
mentality, that would lead me to realize that what seems to be correctly conceiv-
able in fact turns out not to be.
The second strategy involves bolstering the claim that the metaphysical theses
in question are conceptual truths. The intuition that they are not conceptually
necessary truths issues both from the fact that it in no way seems to follow from
our concepts of any of the metaphysical terms that the metaphysical theses are
necessary, and from the fact that we seem to be able to correctly conceive of worlds
in which those theses do not hold. This makes it sound as though our expectation
is that we examine a single concept to determine whether there is conceptual
necessity where in fact we are evaluating whole metaphysical views, not individual
concepts.
Thus we might re-conceptualize the project of a priori reasoning in a way that
is more consistent with recent proponents of conceptual analysis. According to
these views, a priori reasoning involves fitting together many interrelated con-
cepts. We determine what is conceptually necessary by determining what is the
best, most elegant systematization of our concepts (see for instance Jackson 1998).
We are faced with a number of rival metaphysical packages. There are competing
packages within a particular domain in metaphysics – sub-packages – and there are
complete metaphysical packages, packages, which, if true, completely describe
the metaphysics of our world. The kind of reasoning engaged in by metaphysicians
can best be thought of as a way of determining which sub-packages are most
coherent: which fit best with our folk intuitions; which make most sense of the
phenomena to be explained; which give us the most explanatory power; which fit
best with other metaphysical packages and so on until ultimately at the end of
investigation, after reflective equilibration, we are in a position to determine which
is the preferable complete metaphysical package. The complete metaphysical
package that we converge on after this investigation is conceptually necessary, for
the process of determining which complete package to adopt just is the process of
determining which complete package is conceptually necessary. Since we are
nowhere near being in a position to choose a complete metaphysical package, we
should not be surprised if individual competing sub-packages can each appear to
be correctly conceivable.
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Perhaps it is mere foot-stamping to note that this does not seem to ring true.
Anti-Humeans and Humeans adopt very different metaphysical sub-packages
across a wide range of domains. But, at least at this stage of investigation, it is hard
to see that the Humean will find the anti-Humean’s view conceptually necessarily
false. She will think it ontologically inflationary and objectionable in a whole host
of ways. But not, surely, conceptually incoherent.
It seems to me that the process described above is not the process of arriving
at a conceptual truth. It is a process that involves thinking about our concepts,
and considering how different metaphysical views make sense of those concepts
and make sense of our world and explain various phenomena. It is an a priori
process that at times appeals to conceptual analysis, or to facts about our con-
cepts. But it is not, for all that, a process that yields conceptual truths in any
ordinary sense: it does not yield truths such that, at the end of inquiry, we find
competing claims incoherent. Rather, this process is really one of a priori reflec-
tion designed to tell us which metaphysical account is a ‘best fit’. That is con-
sistent with the metaphysical truths being synthetic a priori truths rather than
conceptually necessary truths, albeit that some of the a priori data involve reflec-
tion on our concepts.
At least, if the proponent of this view really intends that the view that is
converged upon is conceptually necessary, more needs to be said about why we
should expect convergence, and why nothing like ‘proto’ conceptual incoherence
is so far apparent in our investigation (that is, why so far into our investigation we
cannot even begin to see what it is about alternative metaphysical claims that might
ultimately lead us to say that they are incoherent). Without saying more, such an
account makes it too easy for the necessitarian. Suppose that after considerable
reflection there is no convergence on a particular CMA. Then it is always open to
the necessitarian to claim that the end of inquiry has not been reached. After all,
how does one determine where the end of inquiry is? It cannot be defined in terms
of convergence, for then it will be impossible to show, of some metaphysical
claim, that it is not conceptually necessary. The necessitarian needs to say some-
thing more about convergence if her view is not to come out as trivial in virtue of
being true no matter what we discover.
We might appeal to intuition to tell us, roughly speaking, where we are in the
inquiry process. Then we might say that if we think that we are near the end of
inquiry, and it does not appear that reflective equilibration will yield convergence,
we should conclude that the views under consideration are not conceptually
necessary unless we have some view about how reflection will ultimately lead to
convergence and some reason to think that whatever we converge upon really will
be conceptually necessary. No such story is forthcoming in the cases under
consideration. So the necessitarian ought not to pin her hopes on the claim that the
CMAs are conceptually necessary.
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4.2. Metaphysical claims as synthetic a priori truths
We might nevertheless think that, roughly, the process just described is the correct
one. But we might instead view it as yielding synthetic a priori rather than
conceptual truths. It seems to me that what lies behind this idea is that when we
have competing metaphysical packages, such as the CMAs, that are empirically
equivalent, all there is to metaphysical discovery is this process of equilibration
and conceptual stock-taking. Let us call the metaphysical package that is prefer-
able, after ideal reflection given the various constraints listed above, the more
virtuous package. Then if we have reason to think that the very same a priori
reasoning holds true in every world – which is really to say that the same CMA will
be more virtuous in every world – then we have reason to think that whichever
CMA is true, is necessarily true.
We can then explain why correct conception is not always a good guide to
possibility. For it seems likely that we can correctly conceive that, say, pluralism
is true at a world, even though monism is necessary, since it turns out that monism
is more virtuous at every world.
Now, in general it does not look very plausible to move from the claim that,
from the perspective of the agents in any world w, there is a particular form of a
priori reasoning R, such that in w the agents should conclude P, to the conclusion
that necessarily P. After all, a priori reasoning is not infallible reasoning: agents
in two different worlds might have the same a priori reasons to believe P, yet P
might only be true in one of those worlds. My reasons for thinking I am not a brain
in a vat are a priori, but a brain in a vat has the very same reasons, it is just that
in her world, her a priori reasons lead her astray. So unless we have already ruled
out contingentism, the fact that the same a priori reasoning would lead agents in
different worlds to each conclude that the very same CMA is true at each of their
worlds is no evidence that that claim is necessarily true. If contingentism is true,
some of those agents simply turn out to live in sceptical worlds.
Perhaps, though, the idea is that all there is to a metaphysical claim’s being true
at a world is that it is the most virtuous. Then if a priori reflection tells us that that
package will be more virtuous in every world, then that just is the discovery that
that claim is necessarily true. The kind of equilibrative a priori process of discov-
ering virtue, on the one hand, and the discovery of metaphysical truth, on the other,
cannot come apart. So there can be no sceptical worlds.
Is this the view that metaphysical debates are merely semantic, rather than
reflecting genuine metaphysical differences between the theories?27 In part that
depends on what one thinks it would take for there to be genuine metaphysical
differences. One might say that there are genuine differences just if there is a fact
27 For views such as these see Hirsch (2002); Carnap (1932); Putnam (1987, 1988) and
Yablo (1998). For an account of when theories are equivalent see Miller (2005).
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of the matter, a truth-maker if you will, that grounds the truth of only one CMA in
any world. According to the view under consideration, a CMA is true at a world
just in case ideal reflection reveals that it is more virtuous than every other CMA.
This is consistent with a number of different views about the truth-maker of a
CMA. One might think, for instance, that there are objective theoretical virtues,
and that it is constitutive of being a theoretical virtue that that virtue tracks truth.
So if a theory is more virtuous in every world then it follows that it is necessarily
true. When we discover, a priori, which is more virtuous we thereby discover
which is necessarily true, but we are discovering a perfectly objective metaphysi-
cal fact. On this view, there is some metaphysical fact, F, in virtue of which a
particular CMA is true at a world, but the presence of F at a world is necessarily
linked to the CMA being more virtuous at that world. Another alternative embraces
the idea that there are objective theoretical virtues, but holds that what it is for a
metaphysical claim of this sort to be true just is for it to be more virtuous: virtue
is constitutive of truth. There are objective facts about virtue, and hence objective
facts about which CMA is true at a world so long as one CMA is uniquely more
virtuous, but that fact just lies in whether that CMA is more virtuous or not at that
world. Finally, one might embrace the idea that virtue is constitutive of truth, but
hold a more psychologistic view of virtue, according to which virtue depends on
various properties of humans as knowers: which theory is more virtuous depends
on our particular explanatory needs given our mental capacities and our concepts.
Then there are objective facts regarding theory virtue, but these facts depend on
our interests. So if a particular CMA is more virtuous in every world, it is true in
every world and hence necessary; although, had it been that we had different
explanatory interests, or slightly different mental capacities, it would have been
that some other CMA was true and, perhaps, necessarily so.
In all three of these cases there is a truth-maker at each world in virtue of which
a particular CMA is true. Set aside the first case for a moment. In the second case
the truth-maker is the existence of some objective virtue of the theory in each
world, which constitutes its truth. In the third case the truth-maker is the existence
of some objective, but agent-relative, virtue of the theory in each world, which
constitutes its truth. Suffice to say, these are pretty deflationary views about the
nature of truth-makers for metaphysical claims. In some good sense the third
option does seem to render metaphysical disputes, if not merely semantic, then at
least not really genuine either. What determines whether monism or pluralism is
true is not whether or not the world or its sub-parts are more fundamental, or under
what conditions composition occurs, but, rather, which of these claims makes most
sense to us and is most useful. In a sense, the concept of a theoretical virtue turns
out to be a rigid one, such that, whatever features of a theory make it more
explanatory given our actual psychological properties, necessarily those features
are the virtues. If a unique CMA has those virtues in every world, it is necessarily
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true. When we seem to conceive that some other CMA is possible, we are not
correctly conceiving a counterfactual world in which that CMA is true; rather, we
are correctly conceiving of a possible world as actual, in which our explanatory
purposes and psychological properties are a particular way (a way that is different
from the way they are in fact) such that given those purposes the CMA in question
is more virtuous and necessarily so. That is to do no more than note that if actually
water is XYZ and not H2O, then, necessarily, water is XYZ. The problem with this
option is that it is just far too deflationary for most metaphysicians’ tastes. Even if
we embrace this option, it in no way follows, as we will see shortly, that any of the
CMAs are necessary, for it is an open question indeed whether any unique CMA
is more virtuous in every world. So this view is consistent with contingentism and
we might well have reason to think that, if it were true, contingentism would
follow.
Of course, as I noted earlier, if one thinks that there is a necessary connection
between virtue and truth, and that we gain access to a priori synthetic truths, then
one does not need to provide an account that explains why what seems to be
correctly conceivable is really not conceivable. Rather, one can reject the notion
that what is correctly conceivable is possible. The defender of the second option,
who thinks that non-agent relative virtues constitute the truth of metaphysical
claims, will reject correct conceivability for such claims. Again, I think this view
is too deflationary – how can it be that the metaphysical truth depends on the
convergence of agents – but more importantly I note that it need not push us
towards necessitarianism for the very same reasons as those given with respect to
the third option just discussed.
The first option is the least deflationary, and, to that end, probably the most
amendable to the metaphysician. On this view, there is a necessary connection
between the truth of a theory and its being virtuous. The virtues track truth but do
not constitute it. This entails that if a CMA is more virtuous in every world, then
it is necessarily true. But now it is not obvious why we should suppose that the
process of reflection and equilibration described earlier is a process that tracks the
real virtues. It is constitutive of the virtues that they track truth. But why think that
the kind of a priori reasoning we engage in yields virtues in this sense. Although
we have closed the gap between truth and virtue, we have opened up a gap between
the results of ideal a priori reflection on the one hand, and objective virtue on the
other. We have few reasons to suppose that the things we call virtues are neces-
sarily linked to truth.28
28 Cameron (forthcoming) makes the suggestion that we deny that if there is a CMA that
is more theoretically virtuous in every world than its competitors, that is reason to think it is
necessarily true. This suggestion differs in that it takes it as constitutive of the real virtues that
they lead to truth, but suggests that the proto-virtues might not be the actual virtues.
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Even setting aside that worry, there is every possibility that after ideal a priori
reflection we will discover that different CMAs are differently virtuous in different
worlds. For simplicity, let us focus just on the ‘traditional’ theoretical virtues
(which arguably do not include various features that the virtues, in the sense in
which I have been using the term, will include, such as how well a metaphysical
package systematizes our concepts or makes sense of our folk theories, or fits with
other metaphysical packages and so forth) to get a flavour for why this might be so.
Even if for every theoretical virtue, T, there is a unique CMA that is more virtuous
with respect to T than any other CMA, it does not follow that there is a unique
CMA that is more theoretically virtuous simpliciter than any other. Consider the
virtue of ontological parsimony. We might be tempted to say that nihilistic monism
is the most ontologically parsimonious account since it posits the fewest entities.
On the other hand, nihilistic monism posits more relations than other CMAs.
Nihilist monists hold that there is no coffee table in what I would call my living
room. But the world does instantiate a particular property at a particular location.
It has the property of being, as we might say, ‘coffee-table-esque’ at a location. In
order to be able to talk about the properties of the world at locations without
positing the existence of objects at those locations, the nihilist monist needs to
introduce a set of new relations: adverbialized instantiation relations.29 The details
of this proposal are incidental, but roughly the idea is that the world instantiates
properties like being coffee-table-esque in a ‘regional’ manner and that does not
commit one to the existence of a coffee table. If these relations are part of ontology,
then nihilist monism is probably not more ontologically parsimonious than the
other CMAs. If they are not part of ontology, then nihilist monism is more
ontologically parsimonious than rival views, but it is less simple. So what it gains
with respect to one virtue, it loses with respect to another. Indeed, it looks prima
facie plausible that this will generally be the case: what one CMA loses with
respect to certain virtues, it makes up with respect to others.
There are two ways in which theories can be equally theoretically virtuous.
They can be what we might call strongly equally virtuous, where two theories T1
and T2 are strongly equally virtuous iff for every theoretical virtue V, T1 has V to
the same degree as T2. Or they can be weakly equally virtuous, where two theories
T1 and T2 are weakly equally virtuous iff there are theoretical virtues V1 . . . Vn,
such that T1 has each Vi to a different degree than T2, but the average degree of
theoretical virtue of T1 is the same as the average degree of virtue of T2. That is, one
is tempted to say that the virtues even out, so that the total ‘virtuousness package’
is the same for each theory. Given that the a priori process of reflection in question
29 These relations are analogous to the kind of temporally adverbialized instantiation
relations to which endurantists about persistence appeal when they say, for instance, that an
object has a property P in a t1ly manner, and lacks P in a t2ly manner.
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is really interested in the total virtuousness package of metaphysical theories, it
could well be that this process would yield the conclusion that at least some of the
CMAs are weakly equally virtuous and therefore equally virtuous in the relevant
sense. In that case, ideal a priori reflection would yield a contingentist conclusion:
different CMAs are true in different worlds.30
Now what I have said here does not settle the matter. I have not shown that at
least some of the CMAs are equally virtuous across worlds. But neither has the
necessitarian shown that a unique CMA is the most virtuous across worlds. Nor, I
think, do the prospects for the necessitarian seem that good. Here is a proposal that
would make a necessitarian conclusion more likely: it turns out that ontological
parsimony always trumps simplicity.31 Then nihilistic monism is always the most
virtuous and necessitarianism wins the day. Quite so. But notice that to get the
necessitarian verdict here we need to presuppose something that seems very
dubious. If the virtues function at all with respect to metaphysical claims the way
they do with respect to scientific claims, then it seems very unlikely that parsimony
always trumps simplicity. Otherwise I take it we should all be convinced that
positrons are electrons going backwards in time: less simple, more parsimonious.
On the other hand, if we can take no lessons about the virtues from the sciences,
then I see no way to get a handle on them.
Thus, the contingentist should note, if we are to attain synthetic a priori
necessities by this method then there is all the danger in the world that our a priori
reasoning does not track the objective virtues. Thus even if it turns out that a priori
reasoning leads us to converge on a particular CMA as being true in every world,
we should be suspicious that this process really does track the objective virtues,
and thus the truth. But insofar as we do think that our a priori reasoning yields true
virtue, either because we are optimistic about our a priori reasoning, or because
we have a deflationary view such as those presented as options two and three, it is
by no means a foregone conclusion that this process will lead us to converge on a
single CMA that is more virtuous in every world. Insofar as we think that this
reasoning is good, we might well think that it could equally lead us to be contin-
gentists about these metaphysical claims.
5. Knowledge in a contingentist world
Perhaps though, there are other reasons to be a necessitarian. One might worry that
contingentism raises the prospect of rampant metaphysical scepticism such that we
could never have any reason to think that the metaphysics of the actual world was
30 For a discussion of some of these issues see Horgan (2000 and forthcoming).
31 A referee made this suggestion.
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this way rather than that. Since we can have such reasons, contingentism must be
false. To sum it up, necessitarianism is the only view consistent with a decent
epistemology.
5.1. Qualitatively indistinguishable worlds and other sceptical worries
Suppose contingentism is true. Then there is a pair of qualitatively indistinguish-
able worlds, w and w’, such that in w nihilistic monism is true, and in w’
universalistic pluralism is true. Then the metaphysical facts of fundamentality and
ontology fail to supervene on the qualitative facts. This renders metaphysical facts
epistemically inaccessible since we have access only to the qualitative facts and
the facts that supervene on those facts. So we could never know which CMA is
actually true. This is absurd, so contingentism is absurd.
Notice first that there is all the difference in the world between pointing out that
being committed to contingentism might lead to epistemological problems, and
concluding that contingentism is false on that basis. On those grounds we should
conclude that there are no worlds in which there are brains in a vat who think
thoughts just like ours, or worlds that are subjectively just like this one but where
agents are systematically misled.
Having said that, contingentists might deny the existence of these qualitatively
indistinguishable worlds by holding that the relevant metaphysical facts do super-
vene on qualitative facts. For instance, as we will see in the following section, it
might be that we have reason to hold that monism is true at gunk worlds, and
pluralism is true at non-gunk worlds. So perhaps fundamentality facts supervene
on facts about whether a world is infinitely divisible into parts.
The other option is to deny that the existence of this pair of words is problem-
atic – or at least to deny that the necessitarian view is epistemically superior. The
necessitarian holds that whichever CMA is true, it is true in all worlds, regardless
of which qualitative facts hold. The metaphysical facts supervene on the qualita-
tive facts, but they do so in an entirely trivial manner. Given necessitarianism, we
know that for any worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 differ with respect to the
metaphysical facts, then they differ with respect to the qualitative facts.32 This is
trivially true, because, given necessitarianism, there are no worlds that differ with
respect to the metaphysical facts. To put it another way, any necessarily true claim
is entailed by the qualitative facts. So if monism is necessarily true, the sense in
which it is entailed by the qualitative facts is no more informative than the sense
32 Technically, A properties globally supervene on B properties iff for any worlds w1 and
w2, if w1 and w2 have exactly the same world-wide pattern of distribution of B-properties, then
they have exactly the same world-wide pattern of distribution of A-properties. The converse of
this is sometimes known as determination. Then A properties are determined by B properties iff
for any worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 differ with respect to their distribution of A properties, then
they differ with respect to their distribution of B properties.
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in which the mathematical truths are entailed by the qualitative facts. Nothing
about the nature of a world tells us which CMA is true, because there is no
difference in the qualitative facts that could produce a difference in the metaphysi-
cal facts. So we can no more ascertain which (necessary) CMA is true by exam-
ining the qualitative features of the actual world than we can ascertain which
(contingent) CMA is true by examining those features. On this score, contingen-
tists and necessitarians are in the same boat.
5.2. A priori conditionals, a posteriori knowledge
Now, the necessitarian might maintain that she has a better account of the
epistemic accessibility of metaphysical truths, because she can claim that we
arrive at metaphysical knowledge through a priori reasoning. But the contingentist
is not barred from a priori reasoning. The problem, I take it, is that once we allow
that metaphysical truths are contingent, we allow that there are agents in exactly
the same epistemic position as us, with the same a priori reasons, who are wrong
in their metaphysical conclusions because in their world some other metaphysical
claim is true.
As I said previously, I do not see that we can draw metaphysical conclusions
from epistemological concerns or lack thereof. Still, the contingentist needs to
say more. In general the worry here is how a priori reasoning can tell us about
contingent features of our world given that there is no plausible account of the
contingent a priori.33 I think there are a few options open to the contingentist. One
option is to hold a deflationary view such as those discussed earlier, and claim that
the CMAs are contingent truths because different CMAs will be the most virtuous
in different worlds. Then agents have access to the same a priori reasons, but are
differently located with respect to the a posteriori facts about their world, and
thus agents in different worlds are not in the same epistemic situation at all.
No epistemological problems then arise, since there is no gap between a theory’s
being the most virtuous and its being true. Given a deflationist presupposition, the
contingentist and the necessitarian are in the same epistemic boat – they just
disagree about whether the same CMA will turn out to be more virtuous in every
world. The other possibility is that one embraces the non-deflationary account –
option one. This does open up epistemological worries, since there is reason to
doubt that the results of ideal reflection track the real virtues. But that worry is the
same for contingentists and necessitarians alike. If one assumes that ideal reflec-
tion is a good guide to the real virtues, then the debate between contingentists and
necessitarians is, again, a debate about whether ideal reflection tells us that the
33 Or at least, the only accounts of the contingent a priori on offer are clearly not of the
sort that would generalize to first-order claims in metaphysics, such as the accounts of Kripke
(1980) and Donnellan (1977).
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same CMA is more virtuous in every world. If one does not assume any such thing,
then it is hard to see how one would come by metaphysical truths whether one was
a necessitarian or a contingentist. Given either of these two strategies that see
metaphysical truths as synthetic a priori, the contingentist is in no worse a position
than the necessitarian.
The other contingentist option is to hold that metaphysical truths are known a
posteriori. Prima facie that seems to push contingentists in one of two unpalatable
directions: towards what I will call scientism, on the one hand, or anti-scientism,
on the other. To embrace scientism is to accept that a posteriori investigation is
best understood in terms of scientific methodology. So one way or another, meta-
physics will be dissolved into the natural sciences, either by scientific inquiry
discovering the relevant truth-makers of the contingent claims, or by discovering
that there are no such truth-makers and hence that metaphysical claims are
vacuous. Neither of these possibilities bodes well.
Alternatively, the contingentist could embrace anti-scientism, which would be
to accept that, although metaphysical claims are known a posteriori, scientific
methodology is not the appropriate methodology. What, then, is? I tentatively
make the following suggestion. Much of what metaphysicians are doing is a priori
reasoning that yields necessary truths that are themselves conditional claims,
where the antecedent of the conditional is contingent. For instance, it is an a priori
conceptual truth that necessarily something is a tiger just in case it has features
F1 . . . Fn, and has causal ancestry C (let us suppose). But it is a contingent a
posteriori matter whether there are any tigers, since there might actually be
nothing with those features and that ancestry. Suppose then, that there was an a
priori necessary conditional claims of the form, ‘if w has feature F, then CMAi is
true in w’. Then if it is a contingent matter whether or not some w has F, it will be
contingent whether CMAi is true in that world. How one sees this view depends on
how one views these conditionals. One option is that they are synthetic a priori
claims. In that case, these conditional claims add meat to the claims of the
contingentists we have already met, who appeal to a priori reasoning to show that
different CMAs are true in different worlds because different CMAs are more
virtuous in different worlds. The conditionals, in effect, distil some of this infor-
mation about virtue into a conditional with a contingent antecedent. Given that
these conditionals have contingent antecedents, however, if it is an a posteriori
matter whether an antecedent is true in a particular world, then it will be an a
posteriori matter to determine which CMA is true at that world. All we can
determine a priori is the set of conditionals, not which world we are in.
Alternatively, we might think that these conditionals are conceptual truths,
therefore allowing us to embrace the view that whatever is correctly conceivable is
possible. We cannot correctly conceive that the conditionals are false. We can
correctly conceive that different CMAs are possible, and thus, they are possible.
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But since correct conceivability involves specifying all the relevant features of a
world, it will not be possible to correctly conceive both that the antecedent of those
conditionals is true at a world, and the consequent false. Thus we will be able to
determine, in conjunction with these conceptual truths, which metaphysical truths
hold at which world, although that discovery will itself be a posteriori.
Are there such conditional claims? The next section considers two arguments
purporting to show the necessary modal status of the CMAs. It will be useful to
examine these arguments and to see why, instead, they should push us towards
contingentism. In the process we can see how we might come up with conditional
claims of the above form. It will then be a further question whether these condi-
tionals are best thought of as conceptual truths or as synthetic a priori claims, or
whether we find some of both.
5.2.1. Conditional claims: a gunky example
A particular is composed of gunk just in case for every part of that particular, that
part has a further proper part. Call a world entirely composed of gunk a gunk
world. It has been claimed that the possibility of a gunk world provides an
argument for monism (Schaffer, unpublished). In a world that is infinitely divisible
into parts, there are no simples. There is no ‘bottom level’ of entities that can be the
fundamental ones from which everything else is composed. In a gunk world
pluralism is false, and, arguably, monism is true: the world is fundamental.34 Call
this the argument from gunk. As I see it, the argument from gunk bolsters the claim
that the CMAs are contingent theses. For simplicity, and I will not argue the case
here, let us suppose that restricted composition is necessarily false because any
non-vague restriction on composition will be arbitrary or ad hoc (this is grist to the
necessitarian mill since it removes one possible source of contingency). Then we
can offer the following argument:
(1) Restrictivist monism is necessarily false (the arguments from vagueness
and non-arbitrariness).
(2) In a gunk world, pluralism is false (argument from gunk).
(3) In a gunk world, nihilism is false (from the definition of gunk).
(4) Therefore in a gunk world restrictivist monism and restrictivist pluralism
and universalist pluralism and nihilism pluralism and nihilist monism are
false (by (1)–(3)).
(5) At any world w, either universalist pluralism or nihilism pluralism or
nihilist monism or universalist monism is true.
(6) Therefore in a gunk world, universalist monism is true.
34 Whether this is so is debatable. For more on this see Cameron (2007).
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The controversial claim here is surely (5), which says, in effect, that the four
CMAs mentioned in this paper exhaust the metaphysical possibilities if contin-
gentism is true. Or, to put it another way, they are the only epistemically possible
metaphysical theories if necessitarianism is true. But perhaps we can correctly
conceive of a gunk world in which, say, some mid-level particulars are fundamen-
tal, and these unrestrictedly compose and unrestrictedly decompose into further
particulars. Then restricted composition is false, as per (1). Nihilism is false, as per
(3), and pluralism is false, as per (2). But monism is also false, since it is the
mid-level particulars that are fundamental. If correct conceivability is a guide to
possibility and this view is correctly conceivable, then (6) is false: not all gunk
worlds are universalist monist worlds. It might be part of our concept of funda-
mentality that it cannot be arbitrary or ad hoc which particulars are fundamental.
It is no accident that for the pluralist, the fundamental things are the ultimate
simples, and for the monist, the fundamental thing is the whole itself. The notion
that some other level of particular could be fundamental, and there exist both
composition and decomposition relations, might be a conceptual error. It is unclear
how plausible this contention is. At any rate, the possibility of this alternative
CMA is not only a problem for contingentists who think that correct conceivability
is a guide to possibility. Those who think that metaphysical truths are synthetic a
priori truths can only rule out the possibility of such a view if they think there is
no world in which that CMA is the most virtuous. Perhaps we can determine this
a priori. Or perhaps we can show that such a view is conceptually incoherent. If
not, the conditional claim that we are trying to attain cannot be of the form, ‘if w
is a gunk world, then universalist monism is true in w’.
That is not to say that there couldn’t be a different conditional that tells us that
if w is a gunk world then either w is a universalist monist world or . . . , where we
need to fill in these ellipses by amending the new gunk argument. Even if this
particular argument only told us that if w is a gunk world then either x or y or z is
true in w, this would be useful for the contingentist since other a priori reflection
yielding other conditionals might ultimately allow us to determine that only one
CMA can be true in w. To simplify matters, let us suppose that the new gunk
argument is sound, whilst keeping in the back our minds that, even if it is not, an
amended form of the argument will yield a different conditional that need not be
useless to the contingentist.
(6) is an a priori necessary truth. Since it is surely a contingent matter whether
a world is a gunk world or not, prima facie the argument ought to push us towards
contingentism about universalist monism. The necessitarian might, however, add
in some premises to try to get out a necessitarian conclusion. She might add in (7).
(7) There is a possible gunk world.
The contingentist too endorses (7). But Schaffer thinks that the gunk argument
plus (7), plus what he calls the generality constraint will yield a necessitarian
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conclusion. According to the generality constraint, the metaphysically basic enti-
ties must have a form that fits all possibilities. In other words, there are no ways the
world could be that are not ways the base could be (Schaffer, unpublished, pp.
9–10). Let us add the generality constraint to the above argument to create the new
gunk argument.
(8) The metaphysically fundamental entities must have a form that fits all
possibilities.
If gunk worlds are possible, then the basic entities must have a form that is
consistent with those entities existing in a gunk world. In a gunk world, the world
is fundamental – it is the basic entity. Hence the new gunk argument entails that
our account of the basic entities must be one according to which the world is
fundamental. Thus the conclusion to the new gunk argument is that monism is
necessarily true. Notice that even if we accept the new gunk argument, it is not
sufficient to establish necessitarianism, since it establishes Claim 1 (that monism
is necessarily true) but not Claim 2. It is consistent with the new gunk argument
that universalism is true in some worlds (the gunk worlds) and nihilism in others
(the non-gunk worlds), and hence that universalist monism and nihilist monism are
contingent views.
Setting this aside though, is there any reason to believe (6)? Schaffer gives one
argument that does not presuppose necessitarianism, namely that if (6) did not
hold this would entail a spurious multiplication of possibilities. What is so bad
about positing spurious possibilities? Well, it flouts the desideratum of ontological
parsimony. We might not be worried about positing additional possible worlds,
since possible worlds are cheap unless one is a modal realist. But in positing
additional possible worlds we posit additional alien properties and relations, and
this ontological profligacy is objectionable.
Notice that this argument presupposes either that modal ersatzists will eschew
positing impossible worlds, or that, if they do posit them, they will be less
ontologically committed to the entities in those worlds. For if one thinks of the
ontology of possible and impossible worlds as on a par, then it makes no difference,
in terms of ontological parsimony, whether one takes more or fewer worlds to be
possible. But even setting aside the issue of impossible worlds, ontological parsi-
mony only requires limiting ontology to that which is explanatorily required. The
contingentist precisely does not think it is a spurious multiplication. She thinks she
has good reason to reject necessitarianism, in which case those worlds represent
genuine possibilities. But if we have no independent reason to endorse (8), we have
no reason to think that the new gunk argument entails the necessary truth of monism.
Instead, the new gunk argument minus (8) supports contingentism. If gunk
worlds are possible, then, by the new gunk argument, we have reason to think that
in a gunk world monism is true. But what should we think about non-gunk worlds?
Plausibly, we can mount an argument analogous to the gunk argument. In a
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non-gunk world, not every part has a further part. This entails that some particulars
are simple. From this, we can get the following non-gunk argument.
(1) Restrictivist pluralism is necessarily false (the arguments from vagueness
and non-arbitrariness).
(2) In a non-gunk world there are simples.
(3) Nihilistic monism is false in any world with simples (from the definition
of nihilist monism).
(4) In any world w, either universalist pluralism or nihilism pluralism or
nihilist monism or universalist monism is true.
(5) A non-gunk world is a world in which either nihilistic pluralism, or
universalist pluralism, or universalist monism is true.
Again, this argument includes the controversial claim (4), which, for current
purposes, we are accepting. The non-gunk argument does not tell us which CMA
is true in a non-gunk world. Once we have a whole set of conditionals, however,
we might be able to determine at which worlds which CMA is true. At the very
least, we might be able to know which CMA is true in some worlds, and narrow it
down substantially in others. The new gunk argument provides the kind of con-
ditional claim that contingentists are looking for. It gives us reason to endorse the
conditional claim, ‘if w is a gunk world, then universalist monism is true in w’. Or
perhaps, if premise (5) of the new gunk argument is false, that argument gives us
a conditional more like that of the non-gunk argument. Either way, the resulting
conditional is necessary a priori. Is it a conceptual truth?
I think it is plausible that it is a conceptual truth. If (6) is true, then we cannot
correctly conceive of a gunk world in which universalist monism is false. For what
it is to be a gunk world is to be a world where nihilism is false, and if it is a
conceptual truth that the four CMAs are the only possible metaphysical views,
then once we specify the nature of a gunk world we will find the conditional to be
conceptually necessary. On the other hand, if (5) is false, then the new gunk
argument will yield a different conclusion that includes more views in the conse-
quent: but plausibly that conditional, too, will be a conceptual truth about gunk
worlds. It follows from the nature of a gunk world that it is either a world in which
x, y or z is true at that world. That conditional, like the conditional we reach in the
non-gunk argument, is a more complex one. Each of these is a truth we could only
come to after a good deal of reflection. But (given that 4 is a conceptual truth) it
does seem to follow from the concept of a non-gunk world that that world will be
one in which either nihilistic pluralism, universalist pluralism, or universalism
monism is true. Having correctly conceived of a non-gunk world, one could not, in
fact, conceive that that was a world in which nihilistic monism was true. That is
conceptually incoherent. Given that we make further discoveries about other
conditionals, we might find a narrower conceptual claim that links a non-gunk
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world with a particular CMA. That remains to be seen. But even with these two
conditionals we can go some way towards a contingentist epistemology.
In general, then, we first engage in a priori reflection that yields conditional
claims. Since the antecedent is contingent, we require a posteriori facts to deter-
mine which world we are in. Nevertheless, the threat of scepticism does not arise,
since to the extent that we can be sure that ours is, say, a gunk world we can be sure
which CMA is true. So although agents in every world might be in the same
a priori situation, all coming not know the very same sets of conditionals, they will
draw different conclusions about their own world, depending on which of the
antecedents of various conditionals they take to be true.
Consider another example.
5.2.2. Conditional claims and quantum mechanics
Schaffer marshals another argument for monism, what I call the argument from
quantum mechanics. Given the phenomenon of quantum entanglement, the causal
story that physics tells is more likely to be holistic than local. Monism is more
consistent with a holistic causal story than is pluralism, and therefore monism is
more consistent than pluralism with what we currently know about quantum
mechanics (Schaffer, unpublished, pp. 21–25). Let us grant the still speculative
conclusion that the truths of quantum mechanics militate in favour of a monistic
metaphysics.35 Then we have reason to conclude that in any world governed by the
laws of quantum mechanics, monism is true.
This reasoning suggests that monism is true in worlds where the quantum
mechanical laws hold. Given that we have no reason to appeal to the generality
principle, if there are worlds with non-actual laws, as is plausibly the case, then in
those worlds we might have no reason to think that monism is true. More particu-
larly, there could be non-actual laws that militate in favour of pluralism. In such
worlds the physics is very local, say, and not at all holistic. In those worlds we have
reason to think that pluralism is true.
Now, whatever exactly we make of these arguments, it is fairly clear that the
conditional claims we get will not be conceptual truths. We have a priori reasons
to think that worlds with quantum mechanics are monistic, and that worlds with
other very different laws are pluralistic. In this case the conditionals are synthetic
a priori.
Whether all such conditionals are synthetic a priori or some are conceptual
truths is open to debate. In some sense it does not matter, from the point of view
of the epistemology of the contingentist. So long as she can come up with these
conditionals, she can have good reason to think that certain worlds are ones with
35 Schaffer nowhere suggests that pluralism is inconsistent with our best physical theory,
merely that, given the nature of the physical theory, it accords better with monism.
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certain metaphysical truths, and other worlds with different truths. If all the
conditionals are synthetic a priori, then her epistemic position is exactly that of the
necessitarian who also thinks that the relevant metaphysical claims are synthetic a
priori. Ultimately both of these views have to deny that correct conceivability is
always a good guide to what is possible. Instead she embraces the synthetic a
priori: the epistemology is in both cases the same; the disagreement is merely
about which a priori claims are necessary. To the extent that the contingentist
embraces these conditional claims as conceptual truths, she is in a position to hold
that correct conceivability is a good guide to possibility, and that what correct
conceivability tells us is that contingentism is true, but, given a sufficient array of
conditionals, we can still know which metaphysical claims are true in which
worlds by coming to know at which worlds the relevant antecedents of such
conditionals are true.
6. Conclusion
I have tried to show that contingentism is no more epistemically problematic than
necessitarianism. We can have reason to think, of some metaphysical claim, that it
is contingently true. In particular, I think that the CMAs are views of this sort. The
necessitarian about the CMAs needs to show that either monism or pluralism is
necessarily true, and that if monism is necessarily true, then the correct answer to
the special decomposition question is a necessary truth, and if pluralism is neces-
sarily true, then the correct answer to the special composition question is a
necessary truth. I hope that this paper has given us reason to think that the
necessitarian fails on both counts. Whether we think of metaphysical claims as
conceptual truths or as a priori synthetic truths, we have no good reason to think
that the CMAs are modally necessary. At the very least, if the necessitarian thinks
we do then the emphasis is on her to show us why.
Moreover, it may be that contingentism has other benefits. Everyone needs an
account of the hyperintensional, contingentists included. Since opposing meta-
physical views like the CMAs are pretty clearly not conceptually incoherent, the
necessitarian needs a story about the content of necessarily false metaphysical
claims. She had better have a way of making sense of conditionals with necessarily
false antecedents. Likewise, I noted that some of the a priori necessary conditional
claims the contingentist will appeal to look like conceptual truths, whereas others
look less so. So the contingentist will need to say something about the content of
the negation of these necessarily true conditionals. But it may be, and here is a
tentative suggestion only, that the contingentist does not need such a robust
account of the hyperintensional as does the necessitarian. Those who are drawn to
some kind of modal realism – the view that there are irreducible modal truths that
outstrip the truths about our world (not concrete modal realism) – as opposed to
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ersatzism might embrace ersatzism about impossible worlds as a way of making
sense of hyperintensional content. The idea, I take it, is that one can build one’s
ersatzist hyperintensional content out of one’s realist intensional content.
Consider the, let us suppose, necessarily true conditional that in gunk worlds
monism is true. The conditional ‘there is a gunk world in which monism is false’
is necessarily false, and thus even the contingentist will need to appeal to some
ersatz impossible world. But she, as distinct from the necessitarian, has additional
resources in dealing with conditionals like this, since for her there are possible
gunk worlds and possible worlds in which monism is false. Indeed, there are
possible worlds corresponding to each CMA. So she has a lot of background
intensional content upon which to build her hyperintensional content, as it were.
Since the necessitarian has much less intensional content, one might, therefore,
suppose that she will need a more robust account of hyperintensional content.
At least, it is worth contingentists thinking about whether they can parlay their
additional plethora of possible worlds into an advantage when it comes to the
hyperintensional. That might truly push one towards contingentism.*
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